Only time will tell – why temporal information is essential for our neuroscientific understanding of semantics by Olaf Hauk
BRIEF REPORT
Published online: 13 June 2016
# The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Theoretical developments about the nature of se-
mantic representations and processes should be accompanied
by a discussion of how these theories can be validated on the
basis of empirical data. Here, I elaborate on the link between
theory and empirical research, highlighting the need for tem-
poral information in order to distinguish fundamental aspects
of semantics. The generic point that fast cognitive processes
demand fast measurement techniques has been made many
times before, although arguably more often in the psycho-
physiological community than in the metabolic neuroimaging
community. Many reviews on the neuroscience of semantics
mostly or even exclusively focus on metabolic neuroimaging
data. Following an analysis of semantics in terms of the rep-
resentations and processes involved, I argue that fundamental
theoretical debates about the neuroscience of semantics can
only be concluded on the basis of data with sufficient temporal
resolution. Any Bsemantic effect^ may result from a confla-
tion of long-term memory representations, retrieval and work-
ing memory processes, mental imagery, and episodic memory.
This poses challenges for all neuroimaging modalities, but
especially for those with low temporal resolution. It also
throws doubt on the usefulness of contrasts between meaning-
ful and meaningless stimuli, which may differ on a number of
semantic and non-semantic dimensions. I will discuss the con-
sequences of this analysis for research on the role of conver-
gence zones or hubs and distributed modal brain networks,
top-down modulation of task and context as well as
interactivity between levels of the processing hierarchy, for
example in the framework of predictive coding.
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Embodied cognition
Motivation
The question of how our minds represent and process infor-
mation about the external world, such as objects, actions, peo-
ple, and events, in order tomake inferences from observations,
predict future events, or communicate with other individuals,
is central to most areas of cognitive science (Barsalou, 2008;
Harnad, 1990; Searle, 1980). Cognitive neuroscience ad-
dresses this issue by attempting to reveal the neural code that
underlies semantic representations and processes. For empiri-
cal research to be successful, theoretical developments about
the nature of semantic representations and processes should
go hand-in-hand with a discussion of how these theories can
be tested and distinguished on the basis of empirical data –we
should ask questions that we can answer. Most of the major
debates, for example about the role of distributed brain sys-
tems in semantics, or about the existence and localization of
convergence zones and hub regions, or about the influence of
top-down control on semantic processing, are still waiting to
be concluded. A detailed review of the empirical literature on
these issues is beyond the scope of the present paper, and I do
not attempt to draw any of these debates to a conclusion here.
Instead, I attempt to make a simple and general but important
point, namely that the temporal resolution of our measurement
modalities can affect our ability to resolve these theoretical
debates.
Usually, functional imaging results are not interpreted in
isolation. It is widely acknowledged that multimodal evidence
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is required. For example, functional and anatomic neuroimag-
ing have been used to confirm and refine neuropsychological
findings, for example to explain why damage to certain brain
systems disrupts certain cognitive functions (Binder & Desai,
2011; Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007; Price, 2000). The
most straightforward and fortunate case of Bconverging
evidence^ is when different methods indeed provide the same
result. However, it is more likely that different methods pro-
duce at least slightly, if not substantially, different outcomes,
and the researcher is faced with the question of what method
to trust for what kind of conclusion.
Most current neuroscientific research on semantics is
based on metabolic neuroimaging, especially functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; see, e.g., reviews:
Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009; Jobard, Crivello,
& Tzourio-Mazoyer, 2003; Taylor, Rastle, & Davis, 2013;
Visser, Jefferies, & Lambon Ralph, 2010). A major as-
sumption behind this research is that localization can tell
us something about function (Henson, 2005; Page, 2006).
For example, in the area of grounded cognition, activation
in sensorimotor systems is supposed to indicate that se-
mantic representations are grounded in sensorimotor repre-
sentations (Barsalou, 2008; Pulvermuller, 2013). However,
there are a number of reasons why different methods may
be sensitive to very different physiological phenomena, or
on different spatial and temporal scales. Even a seemingly
simple concept such as Bbrain activation^ can be highly
complex – does it refer to blood oxygenation, blood vol-
ume, firing rates, synchrony, or the amplitude of oscilla-
tions in the gamma band, the beta band, etc. (Singh,
2012)? From this it follows straightaway that the search
for the best method is an ill-posed problem – the question
should state Bbest for what purpose?^ The methodology
should be chosen on the basis of the theory being tested,
not vice versa – we should first decide what kind of
information we need to address our research questions,
and then check out the options. Unfortunately, there is still
a huge explanatory gap between our theories about higher-
level cognition and the neural mechanisms that implement
them (Carandini, 2012; Embick & Poeppel, 2014).
Here, I would like to elaborate on a point that – in its
generic form – has been made many times before: if the
brain processes we are interested in are fast, then our
measurements should be fast. This point is probably artic-
ulated more often by electroencephalography (EEG), mag-
netoencephalography (MEG), and electrocorticography
(ECoG) researchers than in the fMRI, PET, or NIRS commu-
nities. In the following, I emphasize where temporal informa-
tion is essential for conclusions about functions and computa-
tions in semantic processing (but not restricted to semantic
processing). The conclusion will not be that all questions re-
quire temporal information, or that those that do would not
benefit from other types of information. However, a
satisfactory conclusion to some current issues in cognitive
neuroscience does require temporal information about brain
activation. These issues involve the detection of semantic
hubs, distributed networks, distinguishing top-down from
bottom-up processing, and distinguishing feed-forward from
feedback processing.
Spending or wasting time
Generic arguments
A generic argument in favor of spatio-temporal methods com-
pared to metabolic imaging is that perceptual and cognitive
processes occur very rapidly. Behavioral data already demon-
strate that visual lexical and semantic categorization process-
es, from the retina to button press execution, must be complet-
ed within half a second or faster (Amsel, Urbach, & Kutas,
2013; Hauk, Coutout, Holden, & Chen, 2012; Ratcliff,
Gomez, & McKoon, 2004). Topographies in spontaneous or
task-related EEG/MEG can change within tens of millisec-
onds (Lehmann, Pascual-Marqui, & Michel, 2009).
Any model attempting to explain behavioral or brain data
should take into account everything that may systematically
affect the dependent variable. In the case of fMRI, where
brain activation is integrated across several seconds due to
the slow hemodynamic response function (Buckner, 1998),
the model therefore has to account for processes of up to
several seconds, i.e., well beyond the button press in most
perceptual and cognitive tasks. For EEG and MEG, the
model needs to account for processes up to the latency cho-
sen by the researcher, which may even be before stimulus
presentation or before or after a behavioral response. Con-
sidering that response latencies in common lexical and se-
mantic decision tasks as well as in overt naming are often
below 1 s, this raises the question of how to account for the
remaining seconds in fMRI data. Furthermore, EEG and
MEG studies have shown that psycholinguistic variables,
such as word length or frequency, can affect the brain re-
sponse at multiple latencies (e.g. Amsel, 2011; Hauk, Davis,
Ford, Pulvermuller, & Marslen-Wilson, 2006). It is currently
not clear whether these effects occur in the same or different
brain regions, and it is possible that they at least overlap.
Preempting the following sections, Fig. 1 provides an illus-
tration of word-evoked computations and processes likely to
occur within the first second after stimulus onset.
Temporal resolution would be less of a limitation for fMRI
if the brain was strictly feed-forward, and in a given process-
ing sequence every brain region activated only once at a par-
ticular stage. On the basis of independent knowledge, one
might be able to label different regions as Bearly visual cortex^
or Bfrontal executive control areas.^ However, recurrent acti-
vation can affect early visual areas at later stages (Ahissar &
Psychon Bull Rev (2016) 23:1072–1079 1073
Hochstein, 2004; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; Woodhead,
et al., 2014), and even simple stimuli rapidly activate large
brain networks, including frontal cortex and limbic structures
(Bar, et al., 2006; Bullier, 2001; Morris, et al., 1998).
Irrespective of the duration of perceptual and cognitive
processes, it has been argued that brain networks commu-
nicate at very short temporal scales, represented by differ-
ent frequency bands up to the gamma band (around 30–40
Hz) or high gamma (100 Hz and beyond) (Canolty, et al.,
2006; Engel & Fries, 2010; Siegel, Donner, & Engel,
2012). If this is the case, then separating different net-
works in different frequency ranges, and establishing
phase relationships among areas with those networks, re-
quires imaging modalities with millisecond temporal reso-
lution. While non-spectral connectivity measures exist
(Valdes-Sosa, Roebroeck, Daunizeau, & Friston, 2011),
this requirement will obviously be the same for any meth-
od that relies on information at these temporal scales.
What counts as a Bsemantic^ effect?
It is difficult to disagree with the previous point that if milli-
second temporal resolution is required, then electrophysiolog-
ical recordings are the methods of choice. But is millisecond
temporal resolution essential in order to study semantics? The
fundamental question is whether an observed effect that is
assumed to be the result of the manipulation of a semantic
stimulus or task variable can really be interpreted as a
Bsemantic effect,^ and if so what aspect of semantics does it
represent. In this section, I discuss different views on repre-
sentations and processes that affect the interpretation of neu-
roimaging results as semantic. I do not argue that there is a
unique decomposition of semantics into particular processes
and representations, or that any of the elements have to be
clearly separable from each other in terms of brain regions
or systems. But whatever this decomposition is for a particular
study, one needs to address the question of whether effects of
non-semantic aspects of task or stimuli may be misinterpreted
as semantic. For simplicity, I focus my examples on lexical
semantics, but the same issues are relevant for semantics at the
phrase or sentence level.
The distinction between representation and process has a
long tradition in cognitive science. Marr (1982) defined a
mental representation as "a formal system for making explicit
certain entities or types of information, together with a speci-
fication of how the system does this," i.e., for a representation
to be meaningful one needs to know the processes that may
operate on it. Anderson (1978) argued that every dependent
variable will reflect properties of stimulus representations and
the processes that operate on them, and that these two may
therefore be impossible to distinguish.
The term B(semantic) representation^ is used ubiqui-
tously in the neuroscientific literature on semantics – but
what is a semantic representation? If we ask about how
meaning is represented in semantic memory, then this re-
fers to our acquired knowledge about facts and events
stored in declarative long-term memory. Where do we
store the information that a rose can sting, a stein is for
drinking beer, and that marmots are funny little creatures
when we are not thinking or talking about them? Unfor-
tunately, we cannot see these long-term representations
directly. In any given experiment, we can only measure
the result of processes that operate on these representations
for specific stimuli, tasks, and contexts. Based on a single
experiment, whether resulting in response time distribu-
tions or brain activation patterns, it is impossible to con-
clude with certainty that the observed effects reflect the
inherent structure of long-term representations. This
Baccess versus storage^ problem was already a topic in
the neuropsychologic literature before the time of neuro-
imaging (Rapp & Caramazza, 1993; Warrington &
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Fig. 1 Schematic diagram of Word-Reading-Induced Processes
(“WReInPro”). TheWReInPro diagram lists processes and computations
likely evoked by monomorphemic single-word reading during the first
second after stimulus onset. A possible time-course is illustrated based on
studies discussed in the main text, but a detailed empirical review of the
literature is not within the scope of this paper. LTM long-term memory
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that their data will reflect an amalgamation of long-term
memory representations and the processes that act upon
them in the specific task context.
Relevant task-related information from long-term memory
is accessed through some form of retrieval process, which to a
certain degree will involve executive control processes
(Thompson-Schill, D'Esposito, Aguirre, & Farah, 1997;
Whitney, Kirk, O'Sullivan, Lambon Ralph, & Jefferies,
2012), and may depend both on stimulus type and task. For
example, familiar and unfamiliar stimuli or meaningful and
meaningless stimuli may rely on executive control processes
to different degrees (Hoffman, Jefferies, & Ralph, 2011). Re-
trieving different kinds of information from the same stimuli
may involve different brain regions (Lee, et al., 2002; Rogers,
Hocking, Mechelli, Patterson, & Price, 2005). Do
pseudowords engage the same retrieval processes such as
words, or do they activate the corresponding brain systems
more strongly because one has to Btry harder^ to find a mean-
ing (Mechelli, Gorno-Tempini, & Price, 2003)? Or not at all
because they do not have a meaning?A difficult decision (e.g.,
whether or not to accept a low-frequency word as a word or to
reject a very word-like pseudoword) may trigger additional
types of processes, for example, spell-checking as suggested
for visual word recognition (Balota & Chumbley, 1984). As
long as these processes depend on the prior classification of
the stimulus, timing will help – decision-related processes
should occur later in the brain response. For example, early
effects may rule out explanations in terms of spell-checking or
stimulus re-evaluation.
Semantic information from long-term memory is usually
retrieved for a purpose. In the context of a specific task, task-
relevant information needs to be held in working memory in a
format that allows optimal decision making. In natural read-
ing, information needs to be available in order to be integrated
into context, or it might be discarded if irrelevant. Working
memory has a structure, and for example differs between ver-
bal and pictorial stimuli (Baddeley, 2003), but potentially also
betweenword categories (Shebani & Pulvermuller, 2013). It is
possible that distributed brain systems representing associa-
tions of words or objects with individual sensorimotor expe-
riences support working memory processes. This may be a
basis for claims of some authors that early activation of sen-
sorimotor systems during word processing does not prove
their involvement in semantic processing, but reflects a paral-
lel process that provides a Bcoloring^ of the concept (Mahon
& Caramazza, 2008). In this case, distinguishing early from
later effects will not solve the problem either, since working
memory representations may be required early-on in
processing.
Stimulus processing does not stop with the behavioral
response or completion of the task. We usually do not read
words or look at objects just in order to complete a 2AFC
task, but to think about the meaning, its relevance to the
current situation, to integrate it into a wider context etc.
The corresponding processes may involve Bmental imagery^
(Paivio, 1986). Several neuroimaging studies have made at-
tempts to demonstrate that what they found is Bsemantics^
rather than Bimagery^ (Gold, et al., 2006; Hauk, Davis,
Kherif, & Pulvermuller, 2008; Wheatley, Weisberg,
Beauchamp, & Martin, 2005; Willems, Toni, Hagoort, &
Casasanto, 2010). The imagery argument has been an im-
portant motivation for EEG/MEG studies on semantics,
since the earlier a semantic effect occurs, the less likely it
is to reflect mental imagery (Hauk, Shtyrov, & Pulvermuller,
2008). Drawing the line between semantics and imagery is a
contentious issue in itself, since imagery may be required for
mental simulations involved in higher-level conceptual pro-
cessing (Barsalou, 2008). Here, my point is that it is impor-
tant to be clear about where on the continuum between these
two interpretations one operates. This has implications for
neuroimaging research: Word and pseudoword differences in
fMRI data that some interpret as semantic may actually re-
flect Bthoughts evoked by a word,^ and differences between
animals and tools may be due to imagining a playful dog
compared to thinking about Do-It-Yourself work. The in-
volvement of sensorimotor cortex in imagery processes, for
example, motor cortex for motor imagery (Jeannerod &
Frak, 1999) and visual cortex for visual imagery (Kosslyn,
2005), is well established. Such imagery effects may vary
systematically with semantic variables of interest, and may
for example be stronger for concrete or highly imageable
words, and differ in content between living and non-living
things, actions and objects, etc.
In a similar vein, words may evoke the retrieval of episodic
memories. When presented with the word Bhammer^ or
Bdog^ without any context, one may start imagining how
one once hit one’s thumb with a hammer, or when one last
played with a dog. The type of episodic memory as well as its
strength are likely to differ between meaningful and meaning-
less stimuli, but may also be different among semantic cate-
gories. Pseudowords may not evoke any episodic memories at
all, while objects and tools may evoke episodic memories and
associated imagery that produce differences in brain activation
in different sensorimotor areas. As for imagery, these process-
es are likely to occur late in processing, and may be ruled out
with appropriate temporal information.
The computations and processes discussed above are
summarized in the BWReInPro^ (Word-Reading-Induced
Processes) diagram in Fig. 1. This diagram also suggests
a possible time course for these processes based on studies
discussed in this paper, but a detailed review of the empir-
ical literature must be left to future publications. The main
purpose of this diagram is to illustrate that any behavioral
or brain response at a certain latency reflects a number of
sequential or parallel processes that may be confounded
with semantic variables.
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Who is on top of whom? Interactivity, top-down
and bottom-up processing
In the context of reading, some authors have claimed that Bone
of the oldest debates in visual word recognition concerns the
demarcation between bottom-up and top-down processing^
(Carreiras, Armstrong, Perea, & Frost, 2014). When we say
BTo someone with a hammer, everything looks like a nail,^we
seem to suggest that our goal or context shapes our perception,
i.e., stimulus processes at the earliest stages. This question is
not specific to language. The question of whether top-down
effects manifest themselves as Bfiltering^ of the input or
Bselection^ after the perception process has already been
asked decades ago (Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963; Treisman &
Riley, 1969).
The term top-down modulation has been used in at least
two different ways in the literature. It may refer to the effects
of non-stimulus-related variables such as task or context on
stimulus processing, for example, when word processing is
compared between a semantic and non-semantic task (e.g.,
Chen, Davis, Pulvermuller, & Hauk, 2013, 2015). It may also
refer to the interactivity of brain systems at different levels of
the processing hierarchy. Brain systems at a higher level of the
processing hierarchy may modulate those at a lower level
during stimulus processing, for example, when comparing
connectivity of frontal and inferior temporal areas between
words and pseudowords (e.g., Woodhead, et al., 2014). I will
discuss the Btask modulation^ and Binteractivity^ interpreta-
tions separately.
Some authors treat semantics as inherently task-dependent,
because the relevant perceptual simulations need to be situated
in a specific context (Barsalou, 2008). Others describe seman-
tics as an automatic activation of networks that have evolved
on the basis of associative learning (Pulvermüller, 1999). The-
se two views may be different sides of the same coin:
Barsalou’s theory explicitly distinguishes an early linguistic
stage from a later simulation stage. The former may well be
task independent, and correspond to Pulvermüller’s automatic
ignition of cell assemblies. Also, these cell assemblies may
receive excitatory and inhibitory modulation depending on
task requirements, and task-relevant cell assemblies may re-
main active for a longer period (Pulvermuller, 2013).
In the behavioral literature on visual word recognition, the
task modulation of psycholinguistic effects such as the word
frequency effect has been taken as evidence for flexible, rather
than automatic, word processing (Balota & Yap, 2006). fMRI
studies have shown that activation patterns to the same words
or pictures change with respect to task demands (Lee, et al.,
2002; Rogers, et al., 2005; van Dam, Rueschemeyer,
Lindemann, & Bekkering 2010). These data indicate that dif-
ferent decisions are based on different types of information,
and that stimulus processing differs between tasks. Following
the arguments presented in the previous sections, this does
unfortunately not answer the crucial question as to whether
task demands affect early perceptual processing or later deci-
sion making, or an interaction of the two. Recent EEG/MEG
studies have demonstrated that task demands can affect early
brain responses (Chen, et al., 2013, 2015; Strijkers, Bertrand,
& Grainger, 2015). Importantly, they may affect brain re-
sponses differently in different latency ranges: Chen et al.
(2015) reported task modulation of imageability and word
frequency effects before 250 ms, but task-independent effects
at later latencies, predominantly in the anterior temporal lobe.
Averaging activation across all latency ranges would not be
able to reveal whether task-dependent or task-independent
effects come first. Moreover, short-lived early effects might
be missed.
Top-down modulation may also refer to interactivity of
Blow-level^ regions by Bhigh-level^ regions, for example,
the modulation of visual areas by inferior frontal cortex, or
of posterior temporal regions by anterior temporal lobe. This
requires the interaction of brain regions at a fast temporal
scale. It has been proposed that interactions or connectivity
among brain regions are achieved via oscillations in different
frequency bands (Siegel, et al., 2012). For example, the beta
band (approx. 15–25 Hz) has been associated with top-down
control in visual attention paradigms, and gamma band re-
sponses (above 30 Hz) with bottom-up processing (Engel &
Fries, 2010). Predictive coding has been presented as a general
framework for neural stimulus processing, as a continuous
computation of prediction errors between the predictions of
higher levels of the hierarchy with evidence from lower levels
(Bastos, et al., 2012). Irrespective of the details of these theo-
ries, if gamma and beta band activity reflect qualitatively dif-
ferent processes in different brain networks as fundamental as
top-down and bottom-up processing, then separating these
fundamentally different processes from each other requires
temporal resolution in the millisecond range. Furthermore, if
the connectivity among brain regions is (at least partly)
reflected in phase relationships between oscillations, which
reflect temporal delays on the millisecond scale, then this is
the temporal resolution required during measurement. This is
also the case if connectivity is not reflected in spectral mea-
sures – all that matters is that these mechanisms operate on
very short time scales.
Conclusion
How is the above relevant to current debates on the neurosci-
ence of semantics? Here, I briefly summarize and elaborate on
the examples already used in the previous sections.
To what degree does semantic processing rely on amodal
convergence zones or hubs, and to what degree on distributed
sensorimotor systems? The original proposal of convergence
zones included the possibility of multiple convergence zones
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in different brain areas (Damasio, 1989; Meyer & Damasio,
2009). Semantic dementia research in combination with neu-
roimaging has led to the proposal that anterior temporal lobes
(ATLs) serve as unique semantic hubs (Patterson, et al., 2007;
Rogers, et al., 2004). Other authors have suggested a special
role of angular gyrus (AG) for semantic processing (Binder &
Desai, 2011). An important feature of a hub region should be
that it activates early on in processing, either before or at least
at the same time as other brain areas contributing to semantics,
such as sensorimotor cortex. Consistent early activation of one
particular region, such as ATL or AG, would justify the hub
interpretation compared to multiple convergence zones. It
may also be possible that there are different hubs at different
times, for example, an early hub for the fast retrieval of lexical
semantics, and later hubs for context-dependent simulations,
combinatorial semantics, etc.
It is another important feature of a hub region that it
binds together distributed brain regions, for example, sen-
sorimotor areas in the hub-and-spoke model (Patterson,
et al., 2007; Rogers, et al., 2004). The role of sensorimotor
areas in semantics is still a contentious issue in the litera-
ture on embodied cognition (Barsalou, 2008; Hauk &
Tschentscher, 2013; Mahon, 2014; Pulvermuller, 2013). In
order to test whether hubs and distributed brain regions
activate simultaneously and are functionally and effectively
connected, temporal information is essential. In the fMRI
literature, the interpretation of semantic category differences
is plagued by the Bimagery^ confound (Hauk, Davis, et al.,
2008). It may be difficult to delineate at what point mental
simulations contributing to semantics end and deliberate
mental imagery begins. However, if sensorimotor activation
were to be observed at the time of a button press in a
semantic categorization task, one would have to argue that
this activation did not contribute to the execution of this
task. Temporally distinguishing different levels of semantics
should be part of future theoretical developments.
It is currently not clear how to best capture connectivity
in semantic brain networks, for example whether it is
reflected in Boscillations^ using spectral connectivity mea-
sures such as coherence or phase-locking values. In any
case, if the question is whether changes in activity in one
brain area cause near-simultaneous activity changes in an-
other brain area, then there is no way around temporal
resolution. This is equally important to study interactions
between brain regions associated with different levels of the
processing hierarchy, such as top-down effects from frontal
to visual regions (Woodhead, et al., 2014). If predictive
coding proves to be a productive framework for semantic
processing, the precise predictions of this theory about con-
tinuous computation of prediction errors between different
levels of the processing hierarchy, and the possible role of
oscillations in different frequency bands, can only be ad-
dressed with methods of sufficient temporal resolution.
Similarly, revealing the mechanisms of top-down modula-
tion by task and context requires the temporal resolution to
distinguish early perceptual from later decision-related pro-
cesses, and the possible interaction between the two. The same
brain area may activate at several processing stages, and, for
example, early perceptual areas can be modulated late in pro-
cessing by recurrent activation (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000).
Distinguishing early top-down modulation from late recurrent
activation required temporal information in the range of tens
of milliseconds.
The above analysis of temporal aspects of semantics also
has consequences for stimulus selection and experimental de-
sign. Finding Bsemantic^ brain regions by contrasting mean-
ingful with meaningless stimuli may produce meaningless
results, especially for metabolic imaging, considering the var-
ious confounds from word form frequency to mental imagery
and episodic memory. However, this contrast has been widely
used in the past, as documented in several fMRI meta-
analyses (Binder, et al., 2009; Jobard, et al., 2003; Taylor,
et al., 2013). Some of these issues can be avoided or mini-
mized by focusing on semantic word categories, or using mul-
tiple continuous predictor variables together with possible
confounds in parametric designs (Chen, et al., 2015; Hauk,
Davis, et al., 2008). Even in this case, confounding factors
such as mental imagery and episodic memory need to be ad-
dressed, which is best achieved by focusing on brain activity
in the appropriate latency ranges.
One criticism that affects spatial and spatio-temporal neu-
roimaging methods alike is that they are correlational. Wheth-
er a brain area activates early or late still cannot tell us whether
it supports a particular process, or is just an epiphenomenon.
Nevertheless, temporal information can at least narrow down
the possibilities. Connectivity measures provide more detailed
information about brain networks that can be tested with com-
putationally inspired neuroanatomic models of semantics.
However, the ultimate test for causality is to disturb a brain
region and test the effect on behavior. In healthy participants,
this can be accomplished using transcranial magnetic stimu-
lation (TMS; Devlin & Watkins, 2007). TMS offers the pos-
sibility to stimulate specific brain regions at specific time
points. For the stimulation to be sensitive, these regions and
latencies have to be chosen very carefully. Temporal informa-
tion about the target processes is essential for the definition of
sensitive stimulation latencies.
The obvious methods with high temporal resolution are
EEG, MEG, ECoG, and intracranial recordings. These
methods themselves have important differences, for example,
with respect to sensitivity and spatial resolution that cannot be
discussed in detail here. Some of the issues I discussed in the
preceding sections require a combination of spatial and tem-
poral information, for example, in order to separate hubs from
spokes. Others only require temporal information, for exam-
ple, to separate early from late top-down modulation, but
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would benefit from additional spatial information, for exam-
ple, to localize these effects along the ventral stream. Here, I
focused on the temporal domain since it has so far received
less attention in the literature than spatial localization. One
possible reason for this imbalance, and for the absence of
reviews or meta-analyses of the type provided for fMRI stud-
ies, is the relatively less standardized analysis and presentation
of EEG and MEG results, especially when combined with
source estimation (but see Gross, et al., 2013; Picton, et al.,
2000, for guidelines). For the neuroscience of semantics, I
hope that a more detailed analysis of semantics with respect
to temporal aspects, in combination with the development of
standardized analysis tools for sophisticated spatio-temporal
analysis of brain activity, will bring us closer to answering the
questions that motivated this paper – only time will tell.
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